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Abstract

Even though the 3Rs (i.e., Replacement, Reduction, Refinement) are widely accepted as ethical
standards when evaluating research projects using animals as experimental subjects, the ethical status
of the 3Rs still remains to be clarified. The 3Rs were not derived from any ethical theory, but they
represented an attempt to increase humanity to animal experimentation and at the same time to improve
validity of scientific data (Russell & Burch, 1959). The aim of the present article was to provide an
ethical analysis of the 3Rs through Engelhardt's bioethics theory (1998). The analysis revealed the 3Rs
fitted to some extent Engelhardt ethical values. But the analysis also revealed some internal
contradictions between the 3Rs and Engelhardt's ethical vaules. Although the 3Rs are still valuable
tools in animal ethical evaluation, the present analysis suggests that some ethical issues still remain to
be clarified.
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An ethical analysis of the 3Rs

According to John Webster (1994), the use of animals in biomedical research (or any other
research domain using animals as experimental subjects) entails ethical costs to the animal subjects,
which consist mainly in suffering, pain, distress, infringement upon species typical behavior and death.
In industrial countries, it is mandatory to assess ethical costs before any research project using animals
can be carried out. Such an evaluation aims at minimizing costs to animals and at the same time at
maximizing benefits (both in terms of scientific knowledge and quality of life) for both humans and
animals. In order to carry out this cost-benefit analysis, local animal care and use committees (i.e.,
IACUC) rely on standards that have been referred to as the 3Rs (Russell & Burch, 1959). That is
researchers must look for alternatives to animal use in research (i.e., Replacement), they must use the
minimum number of animals (i.e., Reduction), and they must minimize the pain inflicted on animals
(i.e., Refinement).

Even though the 3Rs are widely accepted as ethical standards, at least in Western societies
(CCAC Guidelines 2000; NHMRC, 1997; Orlans, Beauchamp, Dresser, Morton & Gluck, 1998), and
also taking into account the fact that alternatives to animal use is an expanding field of research (Balls,
van Zeller, & Halder, 2000), which undoubtedly underlines the impact of the 3Rs, the ethical status of
the 3Rs still remains to be clarified. Actually, the 3Rs were not derived from any ethical theory, but
they represented an attempt to increase humanity to animal experimentation and at the same time to
improve validity of scientific data (Russell & Burch, 1959). Given the controversy surrounding animal
experimentation (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992; Regan, 1983; Rowan & Rollin, 1983; Singer, 1990) and the
weight given to the 3Rs in animal ethical evaluation, it appears relevant to address the issue of the
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ethical status of the 3Rs. More precisely, this article aims at providing an ethical analysis of the 3Rs
through Engelhardt's bioethics theory (1998, 1995).

The 3Rs: historical context and definition

Russell and Burch published their landmark book “The Principles of Humane Experimental
Technique” in 1959. It is generally agreed that it had little influence for decades after its publication
(Festing, 1995). But it should also be remembered that their book came out during an era in which
ethical concerns pertaining to animal experimentation were at an all time low (Loew, 1996). As
already underlined, the 3Rs represented an attempt to provide humane treatment to animals used in
experimentation and to secure scientific validity as well.

Humane treatment of animals originated in the late eighteen century when men having dominion
(and power) over animals realized that those animals had to be treated properly (Smith & Boyd, 1991;
Webster 1994). Basically, humane treatment meant lessening pain and fear inflicted on animals
whatever they were used for. But it is in 1831 that Marshall Hall proposed guidelines and principles in
order to ensure proper treatment to animals used in experimentation (see Smith & Boyd, 1991). Hall’s
principles insisted on the necessity to relate any experiment to a definite object, to lessen pain to
animals used in experimentation, to avoid unnecessary repetition of the same experiment, and finally
not to carry out experiments whenever observation could be used. These principles were actually a
compromise between antivivisectionists and animal researchers, especially physiologists (Smith &
Boyd, 1991).
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In some ways Russell and Burch’s 3Rs represented an extension of Hall’s principles. However,
Russell and Burch framed the 3Rs within the Darwinian approach and they based their argumentation
on the most recent (at that time) empirical evidence regarding brain anatomy and both physiological
and psychological processes, especially in vertebrates. In doing so, the alleged that pain could modify
both the physiological and the psychological state of animals. As such, pain could be conceived of as a
confounding variable that had to be eliminated in order to secure valid data. Hence, Russell and Burch
ensured that humane treatment would be correlated with scientific validity. In doing so, they also
found a way to reconcile researchers with procedures aiming at lessening pain inflicted on animals. At
that time, such procedures were often viewed as an obstacle to carry out research (see Russell & Burch,
1959).

This way of thinking was in itself quite revolutionary for the times, as noted by Festing (1995).
Russell and Burch proposed to achieve humane treatment of animals in the specific context of
scientific experimentation by the use of the 3Rs, which are defined below.

Replacement. For Russell and Burch animal use ought to be replaced in two ways. The first is
known as Absolute Replacement and the second is Relative Replacement. Absolute replacement is
defined as:

“In absolute replacement, animals are not required at all at any stage. It follows from what
has been said earlier that absolute replacement may be regarded as the absolute ideal”
(Russell & Burch, p. 70)
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Relative Replacement is defined as:

“Replacement means the substitution for conscious living higher animals of insentient
material. In relative replacement, animals are still required, though in actual experiment they
are exposed, probably or certainly, to no distress at all” (Russell & Burch, p. 64).

The most obvious examples of Absolute Replacement are tissue culture, computers, the use of
microorganisms, non-living physical and chemical systems and, of course, plants. Examples of
Relative Replacement would be the substitution of primates by rats or mammals by fish or reptiles
(Balls 1994; Smyth 1978). What follows from the definition of Replacement is that animals should
only be used after a thorough search and rejection of all the alternative methods. Then, if the use of
animals is deemed essential to the project, the researcher has to use the least sentient species to ensure
valid results.

Reduction. The second principle is reduction:

“Reduction means reduction in the number of animals used to obtain information of given
amount and precision” (Russell and Burch p. 64).

So, to properly reduce the number of animals needed in a particular research project, the
researcher has to apply statistical methods to determine the minimum number of animals needed to
reach statistical significance. This also means that to use the minimum number of animals one has also
to assess the relevance and the quality of the research design (Festing 1995).
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Refinement. Finally, the third principle is refinement:

“Refinement means any decrease in the incidence or severity of inhumane procedures
applied to those animals which still have to be used” (Russell and Burch, 1959, p. 64).

Refinement encompasses every condition under which experimental animals can be put in. It
includes first housing and caring of the animals, which must be done by experienced personnel. Next,
come the experimental procedures themselves. It is the responsibility of every researcher to examine
the manipulations that will be administered to the animals, to determine the risk factors regarding
suffering and to try to minimize them. There should also be a concerted effort to provide analgesics
whenever possible. Also, the animals should be humanely euthanized, that is, with the least amount of
suffering.

In summary, the 3Rs encompass many dimensions such as planning, methods, purchasing,
housing and caring of experimental animals. As such, they allow for good management practices and
proper care of animals used in experimentation and, according to Russell and Burch (1959; see also
Russell, 1998) they should be part of the evaluation of any research project involving animals.

An ethical theory: Engelhardt’s Bioethics

Engelhardt (1998) has elaborated the steps toward an ethics encompassing human life, animal
life and environment. Engelhardt derived his ethical concerns from both a secular and a pluralistic
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point of view. In Engelhardt’s theory (1998), nonmalevolence and beneficence are at the heart of any
ethical concern for all organisms. To respect the former is to act in ways that would not be detrimental
to organisms; while to adhere to the latter is to be good towards all forms of life. From these two
principles are derived four node concepts or values from which norms can be defined.

The first value is reverence for life. This is an affirmation that life, in and of itself, is worthy of
moral concern. This value touches upon other concepts such as beauty and respect. Here, moral
concern is not channeled only through rational thinking but also through an appreciation of aesthetics
about the diverse forms of life. If there ought to be reverence for life, it follows that both individuals
and societies should set boundaries that cannot be crossed under any circumstances. In addition, these
limits should be translated into ethical principles, laws and guidelines in order to make it possible to
weigh some particular use of animals or ecosystems; so as to foresee the consequences of one's actions
on those lives involved.

Stemming from reverence for life arises the second value, which states that life, it and itself, has
dignity. Each organism, no matter how small, is perceived as unique and as such worth respect.
Engelhardt (1998) underlines that this value is problematic in its application because it assumes not
only a dignity that might be violated but also an infringement upon a "legal condition". This creates
some conceptual problems since animals and the environment have no legal rights, thus what could it
mean to violate an organism's dignity if there are no rights? But basically, because animals cannot
consent to anything we might inflict upon them, and because we admit that life itself is worthy of
moral concern, then there should be an obligation to respect life and not to over-use animals for our
own pleasures. This would be the minimal requirement to respect life and its dignity.
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Third, if we are to respect other species and their dignity it follows that we should avoid
inflicting them pain and suffering. Therefore, one major step towards nonviolence would be to
determine the ways animals might suffer and to try to eliminate it. But as any physiologist will tell you
there is a problem in defining precisely what is meant by "pain and suffering" (Rowan 1995). In
addition, in every society there is an acceptance that some suffering and pain are necessary part of
every being's life including humans. Thus what would constitute "needless suffering" remains open to
discussion and begs to be defined. It follows from this that there is an acceptable threshold for every
society that should not be crossed, although some would contend that these limits are still too
permissive (Francione 1996).

The last and fourth value is biodiversity. Engelhardt (1998) points out that biodiversity is
priceless and it stems from the value of respect for life. Because the web of life is characterized by
interconnectedness, we have a moral obligation to protect endangered species and we are responsible
for the environment’s health. Therefore, each and every society has to put forward the criteria by
which some species will (or ought to) be protected (Engelhardt1998); though Engelhardt
acknowledged that it is impossible to save all species from extinction.

Engelhardt's theory and the 3Rs

The first step in analyzing the 3Rs from Engelhardt’s bioethics theory is to examinef to what
extent Replacement, Reduction and Refinement are in agreement with Engelhardt’s four values.
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Absolute replacement is certainly in a close correspondence with all four values of Engelhardt’s
bioethics theory. In looking for absolute replacement one would necessarily respect animals’ life and
dignity. By doing so, there will not be any suffering inflicted to animals. This will also respect
biodiversity, as long as the alternative method is not harmful to the environment. Relative replacement
is also a way to respect life and to reduce suffering. However, that would necessarily benefit only to
the species being replaced, not to the new target species. Hence, one has to restart the whole process
again with the new target species. The way to solve this problem within the 3Rs’ approach is to
replace a species by a less sentient one. However, this is not without any problem. First, if one is to
respect life and dignity, the life and dignity of the species used as substitute are violated. Second, the
“less sentient” argument is based on scientific knowledge, as what was suggested by Russell and
Burch (1959). This argument assumes that the less the brain is complex the less the animal will suffer.
However, Sherwin (2001) has recently challenged this argument in pointing out that invertebrates,
which are usually endowed with a reduced capacity to experience suffering, exhibit similar behavioral
responses in terms of learning and memory than those exhibited by vertebrates. Such behavioral
responses are usually associated with a capacity to experience suffering in vertebrates. Finally,
Carruthers (2004) has recently argued that subjective experience is not necessarily a prerequisite to
pain and suffering.

Reduction also fits with respect for life because in using the minimal number of animals
researchers will avoid to unduly use animals. However, this leaves open the issue of which individual
will be chosen (i.e., will be used as an experimental subject) and which one will not be chosen (i.e.,
will stay alive).
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Finally, refinement is in agreement with nonviolence. Refinement aims at decreasing and/or
eliminating suffering regarding any procedure that could be administered to animals. Post surgery
administration of painkillers is one example among others. However, as such this principle can
contradict the value of respect for life as one can eliminate suffering and the same time put the animal
in a situation in which it will die (as it is often the case in animal experimentation).

But Engelhard’s theory calls for a more elaborate analysis than just a simple mapping of each
of the 3Rs onto each one of the four values. Engelhard’s theoretical framework takes into account the
interconnectedness of the web of life and it also requires social consensus regarding ethical norms. In
this sense, one must address the issue of the contexts in which the 3Rs are used.

First, in what can be referred to as the immediate context, the 3Rs are used within the context of
ethical animal evaluation. That is, as proposed by Russell and Burch (1959), they are part of the
evaluation of any research project involving animals used as experimental subjects. Animal ethical
evaluation is a complex process that entails both ethical judgment and scientific reasoning (Houde,
Dumas & Leroux, 2003). As such, the 3Rs are bound to the basic premise underlying animal ethical
evaluation which states that what it is not scientifically valid cannot be ethical. Accordingly, each
research project involving animals as experimental subjects has to be assessed from a scientific point
of view regarding crucial elements such as the rationale underlying the project, the research
hypotheses, the experimental design and so on. This means that scientific validity is not strictly limited
to the elimination of pain as a confounding variable. This certainly adds to the ethical dimension of the
3Rs.
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Second, in the extended context, the 3Rs are part of the social phenomenon that we refer to as
animal experimentation. How does the 3Rs relate to the numerous issues linked to animal
experimentation? We can hardly provide a definitive answer to this question. However, at first glance,
there seems to be some major limitations. For example, one can provide conditions that will satisfy the
3Rs requirements, but at the same time use as experimental subjects animals whose genotype have
been modified. Modifying the genotype of an animal certainly raises issues relevant to Engelhardt’ s
ethical values regarding respect of life and dignity (see also Carbone, 2004 and Fleming, 2004 on this
point). But the 3Rs remain silent on this point.

General discussion

Russell and Burch's 3Rs (i.e., Reduction, Replacement and Refinement) are widely accepted as
ethical standards in Western societies regarding animal ethical evaluation. However they were not
derived from any ethical theory. The present article aimed at providing a (preliminary) analysis of the
ethical status of the 3Rs through Engelhardt's bioethics theory. The analysis revealed that the 3Rs
fitted to some extent Engelhardt bioethics theory. Indeed relying on alternative methods to animal use
in experimentation, making an effort to reduce the number of animals used in experimentation and
refining procedures so that pain is eliminated is in agreement with ethical values such as reverence for
life, dignity, painless treatment and biodiversity.

However, the analysis also revealed some contradictions regarding the 3Rs. However people
using the 3Rs do not necessarily conceive these three principles as contradicting each other. People
using the 3Rs do not necessarily conceive the 3Rs as contradicting each other. This is so because when
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evaluating research protocols members of institutional animal care verify separately if each priniple
has been satisified. committees verify each principle separately. Contradiciotns arose because in
analyzing the 3Rs we had to take into account the four ethical values in Engelhardt bioethics theory.
Another reason that might account for the fact that people using the 3Rs do not seem them as
contradicting each other is that these principles focus on a single dimension, that is pain;. Since the
original proposal in the late fifties, scientific knowledge and technology expanded in an exponential
way so that focusing on a single dimension (i.e., pain) may set some limitations to the ethical status of
the 3Rs. It is not to say that the 3Rs are of no practical value in animal ethical evaluation. Quite the
opposite, and as such they are still valuable tools in evaluating research protocols using animals as
experimental subjects (see Houde, Dumas & Leroux, 2003). But as suggested by the present analysis,
some ethical issues still remain to be clarified.

Finally, Engelhardt (1995) acknowledged that animals should not be reduced to "things".
Indeed, he explicitly (Enhelhardt, 1995) stated that we have the duty to take into account the pain and
suffering of animals when applying the principle of beneficence. In this sense, one can ask to what
extent the 3Rs can be conceived of as ethical norms within Engelhardt's theory. So let's assume that
the 3Rs are ethical norms, the main issue would be how to solve the contradictions that were derived
from our analysis. There is no clear answer to this question. Beauchamp (1997) pointed out that one
problem with Engelhardt theory is that it is weak in normative content. That is principles like
beneficence (and ethical values) are far too general so that they can be specified in many ways, even in
"competing" ways (see Beauchamp, 1997, p.98). In addition, according to Engelhardt each community
must address such issues which would led to community relativism. That is how can we proposed
principles if each community can set its own ethical norms. Beauchamp (1997) also underlined that
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this is a real problem when one has to deal with complex multicultural societies as do people using the
3Rs. In some way, a consensus can certainly be reached within the scientific community but it remains
to be seen how such a consensus can be reached within many societies. Nonetheless, Engelhardt
bioethics theory proved to be heuristic in providing a theoretical framework to address the issue of the
ethical status of the 3Rs.
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